

*Peacebuilding and police reform in the new Europe: Lessons from Kosovo**

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1. Summary

Police reform in countries in transition is closely connected to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The article discusses successes and failures, and the role of police, using Kosovo as an example. It is essential to know whether strategies, structures and methods of military and police interventions are working, and we need to know whether the reform of administration, police and judiciary in the aftermath of an international intervention is sustainable. As peace and justice go together, the role of police reform in the context of the reform of the judiciary is discussed. There is an open clash between the mainstream international understanding of what a “just society” or a society, functioning under the “rule of law” is or should be on one side, and the local understanding of the members of a society, who survived different kinds of suppression and war over years or centuries, often by building up their own informal structures and their own rules of living together.

In Kosovo, nine years of a UN international protectorate has achieved remarkably little. The country is called “UNMIKISTAN”, and one may find quotes like “We came, saw and failed” (Zaremba 2007), referring to those who came as experts for UN, OSCE, EU or NGO’s. One reason for the failure is, that neither the military (KFOR), nor the international police force (UNMIK CIVPOL) or the UN administration have been prepared in a proper way for their mission, resulting in disadvantages and bad examples for locals. The organization of administration, as the organization of the reform of public institutions and judiciary in Kosovo was lacking basic social and ethnographic knowledge of the country and the Kosovo society. This resulted in at least partly practising “peacekeeping as tourism” (Sion 2008) and spending more money for international experts and administration than for supporting the country. In 2008, more than nine years after the UN took over responsibility for the country, the legal system is still not working properly and the country is in a disastrous social and economic situation.

Huge, ineffective reconstruction programs and a body of neo-colonial administrators become the focus of local resentment. 53 Separate national police units were under UN umbrella at the beginning practising their own brand of law and order, while at the same time preaching the gospel of universal standards. Police officers or civil workers, arriving in Kosovo with very best intentions, often got frustrated by the burden of UN –or OSCE– administration. Others came to Kosovo as “mission addicts”, spending more time in “networking” and organizing their next mission than taking care of their official and well paid task. Missing cooperation within the international organizations and between these organizations and NGO’s resulted in

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mismanagement and structures of keeping the own organization running while paying no attention to the work of others. To reform public institutions demands more than flying in internationals and imposing new laws or regulations. Civilizing security in a country in transition also needs a strong theoretical background. By using Clifford Shearing's idea of "Nodal Security", the article discusses possibilities to conceptualize and promote security as a local public good: Internationals help to establish the necessary "nodals" and networks.

2. Introduction

In November 2007, three months before Kosovo declared independence, the European Commission Progress Report on Kosovo concluded that in Kosovo "*very little progress has been achieved*" and that a multi-ethnic country seems to be a far removed possibility (European Commission 2007). The report stated that the "*focus on standards before status*" (independence of Kosovo) has significantly delayed reform efforts.

Some former progress has been followed by the lack of capacity to carry out and implement laws. Civil servants are –so the EU report– still vulnerable to political interference, corrupt practices and nepotism: "*corruption is still prevalent, undermining a proper functioning of the institutions in Kosovo*". The conclusion of the report is that "*overall, Kosovo's public administration remains weak and inefficient*". Some progress has been made in reforming public administration, but these reforms are "*at an early stage*". The same observation can be applied to the judicial system, which is still fragile, and the execution of judgement remains insufficient. There is also a discrepancy between the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kosovo, and the ambitions of the government and leaders of the political parties. The focus on status had the effect of undermining all the important economic and social issues.

Considering that human rights were not respected under the supervision of UNMIK and KFOR (examples are the violent demonstrations in March 2004 and February 2007), how can we expect that the situation will change after Kosovo has declared independence? And what is or might be in fact the "supervised independence", mentioned by EU and UN, who (in summer 2008) are still negotiating how the future assistance for the country should be organized?

Police reform in countries in transition is closely connected to what is called "peacekeeping" or "peacebuilding". William Smith (2007) has shown, using Jürgen Habermas's reflections on Kosovo and Iraq, that the past decade has witnessed the emergence of numerous cosmopolitan theories of humanitarian military intervention. These theories anticipate a more cosmopolitan future, where interventions will be authorized by new cosmopolitan institutions and carried out by reformed cosmopolitan military and police. But as long as we do not have such 'cosmopolitan regimes', capable of carrying out militarized 'police actions' (Habermas 2003), we need to know whether the already existing strategies, structures, and methods of military and police activities in the aftermath of an international intervention are working. As long as we do not have functioning supranational institutions, capable of enforcing human rights, or multi-layered institutions and networks of global governance, we need to realize that we are on a "*transitional stage between international and cosmopolitan*

law” (Habermas 1998). And as long as we have to trust in military interventions and military force to advance humanitarian goals, we need to discuss the role of police forces in this context.

To decide whether an intervention is or might be justified by whatever *de iure* or *de facto* reason, it is necessary to find out whether:

a) The military intervention was successful in terms of ending what was the reason for the intervention (e.g., ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against or violation of humanities, etcétera).

b) The after-care of the military intervention, the establishment of rule of law, of a functioning police, judiciary and administration, was organized in such a way, that a possible success by the former intervention will be secured, stabilized and sustainable in a longer run.

To answer these questions, an evaluation of both the intervention and the after-care is necessary. But what are the criteria for such an evaluation? When do we judge an intervention as “successful”, when the after-care?

3. Is “enlightenment” the difference?

Before trying to explain what happened in Kosovo and what are the reasons why “*the world failed in Kosovo*” (King and Mason 2006), it is necessary to comment on what might make it so difficult to understand what was and is still happening on the Balkans. Some people say that the difference between Serbia and Western States is the denial of the “*enlightenment*”. Serbian politicians –that’s how they argue– aim at the collective rights of their nation, whilst the western understanding focuses at the individual rights of people (Rathfelder 2008). This is the supposed reason, why human rights as individual rights are not accepted, and why for Serbs the centre of consideration is the nation or the peoples (*narod* in Serb language). Consequently, they reject the idea of rule of law in a western understanding, as they reject the idea of individualisation of guilt, e.g., in context of war crimes.

War criminals like *Ratko Mladic* and *Radovan Karadzic* (who was finally arrested in July 2008) are in the eyes of Serbs not guilty because they are part of the nation (“*Volkskörper*”) and have acted in the people’s interest. Because of that, they are protected and admired as heroes and not condemned as war criminals (Ivanji 2008). Other nations, defined as enemies, may be punished to protect one’s own nation. Habermas commented on the war in Kosovo as follows: The war “*touches upon a fundamental question which is hotly disputed in political science as well as in philosophy. Constitutional democracies have achieved the great civilizational task of the legal restriction of political force, based on the recognition of the sovereignty of subjects in international law, while a ‘world civil society’ would definitely question this independence of nation states. Does the universalism of the enlightenment here collide with the stubbornness of political force, which is for ever entangled with the drive for collective self-affirmation of a particular community? This is the realist sting in the flesh of human rights policies*” (Habermas 1999/2000).

If we look closer at the discussions in Kosovo and the feeling of the people there, we find astonishing parallels: For “Kosovars”, the nation and the country are

also very important aspects and considerations. They have the desire and the feeling, that after centuries of suppression they ought to have a country of their own, unique for their nation. After the declaration of independence, posters were shown in Prishtina with a man wearing the traditional white hat (“plis”) (see picture 1) with the text “Bac, u kry”, which could be translated like “Uncle, it’s done”. Kids and babies got T-shirts with “I have my own state now”. The future will show whether the newly formed state of Kosovo is really able to survive and to integrate itself into the European Union, establishing good relationships with neighbour countries.

4. International conflicts, military and police interventions

Although the number of civil wars has declined since the early 1990’s, the number of UN operations has grown (see picture 2). We do have a less violent world, but the necessity to deal with these conflicts is still obvious, and the role of police in this context is growing. The overall number of uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping is about 80.000, but police was less than 5.000, and is now more than 9.500, although in August 2007 for Dafur alone the UN asked for 6.500 police officers (see picture 3).

Upon its creation in October 2000, the UN Police Division supported the police components of peace operations primarily by establishing systems and procedures for generating the authorized numbers of police officers for service in these missions. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is working to initiate a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) with an initial team of 25 (!) hand-picked officers, chosen for their skills in all aspects of law enforcement to form “*rapid response teams ideally suited to the immediate demands of 21st century peacekeeping*”. While separate from the UN Police Division, they will collaborate closely with their divisional colleagues. Once operational, the Standing Police Capacity will have two key roles: To provide immediate start-up capability on the ground for the police components of new UN peace operations, including strategic advice to ensure effectiveness; and to provide rapid support to existing UN operations, including assisting with the training of local police forces to help them build capacity.

5. What is “peacebuilding”, and who is involved in it?

Instead of “peacekeeping” we use the term “peacebuilding” in this article to make clear that usually there is no peace to be kept. But peacebuilding itself remains (like peacekeeping) conceptually weak, and very often there seem to be a kind of hidden or unofficial, parallel curriculum for peacekeeping missions. The idea to take care of one’s own country’s security stands behind not only the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but plays also a role on the Balkans and in countries like Georgia. Even the definition, what peace is or should be, is unclear. Is it the absence of “war”? But what is “war”? Is it the absence of violence? But if so, what kind of violence is meant? Everybody would agree in the saying that a civil society is a condition for a peaceful society. But do we ask first for “democracy”, and then for “freedom”? The problem of “*standards before status*” in Kosovo shows the background of this question. The international community demanded given democratic standards first – like right of displaced persons and refugees to return, and freedom of circulation for

all inhabitants– and promised “status” (independence) afterwards. The consequence was, that Kosovo parties and politicians “played” democracy, cheated the internationals and were very clever in doing so, because this kind of behaviour was a general and justified strategy to overcome the Serbian occupation until 1999.

There are obvious problems with coordination and cooperation between those who are involved in peacebuilding, but there are also problems with national and individual interests, with ethical and especially with political interests.

What kind of police do we need for such peacebuilding activities? If we agree on the necessity of an international police force for the implementation of rule of law, of a just society, and of a functioning law system: How should this police force look like? We have different options with advantages and disadvantages. Police forces like the “gendarmerie” in Italy, France or Spain (a more militaristic police) might be one option, police forces practising “community policing” another. Do we want national, transnational or international forces, or a “Joint European Early Intervention Team”?

6. The Balkans and Kosovo

At least some of the countries on the Balkans are disintegrating states that are not able to cope with violence, organized crime, but also suffer socio-economical problems like poverty and unemployment. The competition or rivalry between national ambitions is extremely widespread. The history of this European region is long and filled with wars and changing authorities and regimes. Kosovo itself is in its kind a unique enterprise: Officially it was and still is a part of Serbia under control and administration of the UN. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence, and until June 15, 2008, 44 countries have recognised Kosovo as an independent country. Nevertheless, as UN resolution 1244 is (in summer 2008) still valid: Kosovo is not a state in terms of the international or public state law.

7. A short history of Kosovo

Tito’s death in 1980 resulted in two events: renewed demonstration by Kosovar Albanians for republican status, and complaints by the Serbian Orthodox Church that Serbs were being persecuted and therefore fleeing Kosovo¹. While there can be no doubt that the Serbs were leaving Kosovo and many felt persecuted, it is not the whole story. *“Many were also leaving for economic reasons... Many also believed that in an Albanian-run Kosovo there was little prospect of advancement... Still, as communist power –or rather fear of it– began to dissipate, the ‘Serbian question’ the fate of the Serbs of Kosovo, began to figure into the political debate”* (Judah 2000, p. 94). Slobodan Milosevic rose to power on an anti-Albanian, pro Serbian platform in late 1987. His party’s slogan was *“No force can now stop Serbia’s unification”*. The plan to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy began in 1989. In response the Albanians began to create parallel governing institutions. Most notably they created their own parliament and government.

¹ Main parts of the following chapter have been drafted by Andrew Gridinsky in May 2008.

In July of 1990 Belgrade deprived the illegal Kosovo Parliament from meeting. In response the Parliament met on the steps of the Parliament building and publicly announced the Sovereign Republic of Kosovo. In September the Serbian constitution was changed to redefine Kosovo as a region in Serbia, thus effectively killing any sort of autonomy in the province. These measures resulted in a de-Albanization of cultural and education institutions within Kosovo. Drastically, overnight, Kosovar Albanian communist leaders were dismissed; Kosovar Albanian doctors, nurses, policemen, school teachers and municipal employees all lost their jobs. In response Kosovar Albanians sought to create their own independent shadow republic. All areas of life in Kosovo subsequently remained divided into two parallel worlds, one belonging to the legal Serbian system of government, the other to an Albanian illegal system for organizing all other aspects of life (Vickers 2000, p. 99).

The shadow society that was built by the Kosovar Albanians was accomplished by the resurrection of Albanian education, healthcare institutions, and sports and cultural activities. Private houses became schools. Art exhibitions moved to Albanian owned and operated cafes. The Kosovar Albanians even unofficially renamed the main street in Prishtina as Mother Teresa Boulevard, whereas the Serbs called it St. Vitus Day Street, commemorating the day in which the Battle at Kosovo Polje was fought. Kostovicova writes: *“Following their exclusion from school and university buildings, Albanian students flocked to makeshift classrooms in private houses, garages and attics. There Albanian educators applied their own curricula, which they first rid of old communist content and then amended to give full expression to the Albanian national identity”* (Kostovicova 2000, p. 147).

By the spring of 1991, the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK) had 700,000 members, with offices in Zurich, Stuttgart and Brussels among other cities. The LDK appeared on the scene in 1989. It was led by Ibrahim Rugova (who later became the first elected president of Kosovo), an academic who preached non-violence. This League, together with other Albanian-American organizations, served as a source of funding for the parallel society in Kosovo and lobbying political leaders both in the US and Europe.

The firing of Kosovar Albanians had a devastating impact on the economy. By 1993, over 400,000 Albanian had left Kosovo. They joined other Kosovar Albanians in the US, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and Italy. Many had emigrated before both as *Gastarbeiter* (Europe) and as political asylum seekers. The Albanian Diaspora is close knit group. All felt a moral obligation to contribute funds for the parallel society.

By the mid 1990's Yugoslavia was literally falling apart. To chronicle the break-up of the Yugoslavian Federation, even briefly, is beyond the scope of this abbreviated history. Suffice it to say, that as each republic first threatened to and then succeeded from the Federation, Milosevic's resolve to hold onto Kosovo at all costs only strengthened. The Kosovar Albanians were disappointed by the 1995 Dayton Accord, which in their view failed to recognize their justified claim for independence. The Serbs in Kosovo also became worried as they saw how poorly refugees from other break-away provinces in Yugoslavia were treated in Serbia. As Milosevic tightened his grip on Kosovo, the Serbian population began to arm themselves.

In 1997 the pyramid schemes in Albania began to collapse. In the anarchy and near civil war that followed, army magazines were looted and approximately 600,000



guns appeared on the scene. Simultaneously, the Milosevic regime began an anti-terrorist campaign known as the “First Offensive”. As a result large numbers of Kosovar Albanians were forced from the homes to the mountains. As the situation in Albania stabilized, thousand of Kalashnikov became readily available and were purchased by the KLA. As the civil war heated up, the governments in the United States and Western Europe became increasingly concerned. A “Contact Group on Kosovo” was formed, which consisted of representatives from the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. In March 1998, Secretary of State Madeline Albright addressed the Contact Group and put the blame for the violence in Kosovo squarely on Milosevic and outlined a number of conditions that the government in Belgrade must accept.

The ebb and flow between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo went hand in hand with the ebb and flow between the Contact Group and Belgrade. As thousands of Kosovar Albanians became internally displaced within Kosovo, the KLA sensing that the general Albanian public in Kosovo and abroad and international community was on their side intensified their efforts.

In January 1999, NATO warned it was ready to use military force against the government in Belgrade. A conference was held in Rambouillet, France. Among those present were the members of the Contact Group, KLA and Yugoslavian representatives. Neither side could agree on terms, and the NATO bombing deadline was extended. Two weeks later the conference reconvened. This time the Kosovar Albanians agreed to sign the Rambouillet agreement, Belgrade did not. On March 24, NATO began bombing Serbia. Prior to the bombing all of the international monitors were withdrawn from Kosovo. This gave the Serbian Special Forces free reign on the Kosovar Albanian population. It also resulted in over 850,000 Kosovar Albanians forced to neighbouring countries of Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro while another 1 million were internally displaced.

After 78 days of war, NATO prevailed and on June 11, 1999, Serb forces withdrew and NATO entered Kosovo. The refugees were allowed to come home shortly thereafter. Under the Kosovo Intervention Force (KFOR) Mandate and UN Resolution 1244, the region became a UN Protectorate. Since then, local and national elections have been held. The KLA disbanded and transferred to Kosovo Protection Force (KPC), an equivalent to US Army Guard but without guns.

In 1989 Milosevic abolish the partial autonomy, which was granted Kosovo as a Yugoslav province since 1974. He also started to suppress Kosovo Albanians. They were not allowed to work in public administration, as professors in universities, teachers in schools, or doctors in the health care system. This resulted in a “second economy”: The Kosovars organized their own private universities and schools, individual health care, and a social system, where the people were connected and depended from each other. Those who left the country or had to leave because of political pressure, send money home to their families to support them. Even today, more than one third of the cross national product comes from such Kosovars, living in Switzerland, GB, the US or Germany, and another third or so comes from international aid and donors. Rumours say, that the rest comes from organized crime.

During the conflict roughly a million ethnic Albanians fled or were forcefully driven from Kosovo. An estimated 10,000 to 12,000 ethnic Albanians and 3,000 Serbs

are believed to have been killed during the conflict (the exact numbers and the ethnic distribution of the casualties are uncertain and highly disputed).

After the war ended and the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 that placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, returning Kosovo Albanians attacked Kosovo Serbs, causing some 200,000-280,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians to flee. The current number of internally displaced persons is disputed, with estimates ranging from 65,000 to 250,000. Many displaced Serbs are afraid to return to their homes, even with UNMIK protection. Around 120,000-150,000 Serbs remain in Kosovo.

In 2001, UNMIK promulgated a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo that established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), including an elected Kosovo Assembly, Presidency and office of Prime Minister. Kosovo held its first free, Kosovo-wide elections in late 2001 (municipal elections had been held the previous year). UNMIK oversaw the establishment of a professional, multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service.

8. Where and why the internationals failed in Kosovo

In 2006, King and Mason published their book *Peace at any price. How the world failed in Kosovo*. They provided a sound analysis, how and why the international community failed in establishing a sustainable state. Some further examples are provided in this article. Even in 2008 it is amazing, how little effect this book and other reports and articles have had on the activities of the international community and their organizations.

Violent clashes between Albanians and Serbs in the northern city of Mitrovica broke out in March 2004. The spark was the reported, but not proven drowning of three Albanian children by Serbs. Albanian mobs elsewhere in Kosovo then launched pogroms against small, isolated pockets of Serbs and other minorities, and attacked the occupation forces, which responded with tear-gas, rubber bullets and sometimes live ammunition and evacuated Serbs to safer towns or NATO barracks. In the presence of 17,000 NATO troops and 4,000 UN police, Albanian hooligans fell upon their minorities. 900 People were wounded, 19 died, some 30 churches were destroyed, 700 houses burnt down, 4,500 put to flight. Some 150 KFOR troops and UN police were injured, 72 UN vehicles destroyed, and 200 people arrested. In Priszren, the German KFOR-troops did not show up when Albanians tried to set fire on Serbian houses, a monastery and a church. Months later there was an article in a German journal², talking about “Die Angsthasen vom Amselfeld” (The “coward” or “scaredy cat” of the Amselfeld region). German police, on duty in Priszren for UNMIK CIVPOL, was complaining about lacking support by the German military, stationed nearby. Even in 2008, the Archangel Monastery near Priszren and the monastery of Deçani³ are barbed-wired and under protection of KFOR troops. It is not possible to enter these places without permission by KFOR and the monks.

² *Deutsche Soldaten: Die Hasen vom Amselfeld*, “Der Spiegel”, 19/04.

³ See <http://www.kosovo.net/edecani.html>.



One might ask, where this angry and hate does come from. In 2007, I met a former law student from Bochum, who lived in Germany since the early 1990. He left his home country Kosovo due to political suppression while being a student. With his wife and two children (both born and grown up in Germany), he considered to go back to Kosovo, although he and his family have German passports. In late 2007, he took me to a place in Kosovo which is like a pilgrimage and a national museum for Kosovars: The small village of Prekaz with the graves and the houses of the Jashari family. In this village, more than 100 people have been killed by Serbs. The family (58 people, a three years old children included) of Adem Jashari, one of the founders of UÇK/KLA was extinguished. In the area of Drenica and Skenderaj, more than 1,000 people have been killed by Serbs. As a lawyer and academic, my former student knows the history, and he knows of course, that both sides (Serbian and Albanian Kosovars) did a lot of cruelty. Nevertheless, one could feel his deeply rooted hate against Serbs, who are and have been for him suppressors since centuries. He like his fellow citizens are talking about the “barbarian Serbs”. But in his everyday life, he (again, like his fellow citizens) has been and still is living closely together with Serbs. In summer 2008 one could see wedding parties in Prishtina, passing the city with their cars on their way to the wedding ceremony. One party consisted of a car with Swiss licences plates at the top of the party, waving a huge red Albanian flag (not the new blue Kosovo one). Next was a car with Serbian plates, followed by a German and two Kosovo cars, the bride and the groom with western-style wedding costume in a convertible.

9. Protectorate of kosovo

Kosovo was governed by the UN since 1999⁴. The country was run by international administrators (some of whom have proved corrupt), financed by aid, the remissions of exiles and crime. To quote an experienced and disillusioned aid worker: “*When I came to Kosovo in 2000, many international officials were trying as best they could to push economic development projects. Now everybody seems to think Kosovo is incapable of producing anything and can only live on international aid, injections of money from Albanian exiles in Europe and the proceeds of organized crime*” (Déréns 2003).

The situation in Kosovo was described as “*elephants in front of a water hole*” (“*Elefanten vor dem Wasserloch*”) by the German journal “*Der Spiegel*” in April 2008: International organizations and NGO’s and their representatives are queuing to get their share of the international money. It is estimated, that the international community spent some 33 billion euro for their activities in Kosovo since 1999. This equals 1,750 euro per inhabitant and year. Nevertheless, the per capita cross national product is lower than that of North Korea or Papua-New Guinea, and the black or shadow economy contributes 30 to 40% (May 2008). A study by the independent Institute for European Politics in Berlin for the German Armed Forces (Jopp/Sandawi 2007) summarizes: “*The international community as well as their representatives in Kosovo carry decisive joint responsibility for the alarming spread of mafia structures in Koso-*

⁴ Whilst this article is finished (summer 2008), after the declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008, UN and EU are negotiating how the future international help for Kosovo may be organized.

vo. *They have damaged the credibility of international institutions by the open support of political-criminal actors in varied manner*⁵. Some examples: In 2007, a local translator, working for UN, EU or OSCE, earned some 800 euro per month, a (local) medical doctor at a hospital 200, a teacher 150 and a police officer 220 euro. Contracted internationals in higher positions get 6,000 to 8,500 euros. If seconded, they get their home salary, plus 3,000 euro extra per month. UNMIK and the International Organizations involved have thousands of officials. These administrators usually spend six months to a year in Kosovo. With them, their individual and often the institutional memory is gone, new administrators try to reinvent the wheel and locals lose trust in internationals (Hett 2006).

Journalists say that at least some of the internationals are meeting over dinner and exchanging gossip. They quote the following examples: One from Bulgaria did not keep separate personal and public accounts; another, from Mauritania, dismissed a delegation of Albanian trade unionists, explaining that *“Kosovo is democratic now, no more socialism, no more trade unions”*. Somebody from Africa was hired to rebuild the Kosovo railway system, although he personally had no experience with railways: *“Mr. Bangura teaches the Kosovans how to run a railway and is paid some 8,000 euro a month. Local railwaymen who are supposed to live on 150 euro feel a bit humiliated by the project, especially since Mr. Bangura knows nothing about railways. How could he? He is from Sierra Leone where the last train stopped in 1975. He is an expert in harbours”* (Zaremba 2007). In 2007, a high ranking US police officer, working for UNMIK, was prosecuted for sexual exploitation of women and cooperation with members of the Organized Crime.

To quote again the study of Jopp and Sandawi for the German Armed Forces (2007): *“The UN mission is either called ‘paper tiger’, ‘bureaucratic monster’ or ‘colonial management’, while the international staff has the reputation to pursue either adventurism or individual, unjustified enrichment in Kosovo”*. 90% of the internationals come to Kosovo because of money says a UN police officer from the Organized Crime Unit in Kosovo, quoted by Mayr (2008).

Corruption scandals, some of them at the highest level, have damaged the reputation of the international administration. The former director of the Kosovo Electricity Corporation (from 2001-2003), a 36 years old German from Essen (Jo Truschler), is only one example. 4,5 million US dollars from international donors had disappeared from his books at the Kosovo Electricity Company KEK. He has sold electricity to other countries and the money was transferred to his private account in Gibraltar. Truschler was sentenced to probation in 2007 in Bochum, not for fraud or corruption in Kosovo, but for using false doctor titles in applying for a job in Germany (Zaremba 2007). In the meantime, power supply in Kosovo is still a matter of luck: Usually it breaks down at least three or four times per day.

The former British Head of Prishtina Airport, Ioan Woollett, employed together with his friend three people in average per day, not just ordinary people, but stunning nice young women, without any knowledge of the English language (Zaremba 2007).

⁵ *Die Internationale Gemeinschaft sowie ihre Vertreter im Kosovo tragen maßgebliche Mitverantwortung für die alarmierende Ausbreitung mafiöser Strukturen im Kosovo und haben durch die offene Unterstützung politisch-krimineller Kuppelakteure in vielfältiger Weise die Glaubwürdigkeit internationaler Institutionen beschädigt.*

Some have won beauty contests. Finally, he had 200 more employees than necessary for an airport like this. Many of these women had to be available to Woollett and his friend day and night. His friend left Kosovo after four months to work for the UN in Sudan; Mr. Woollett fled later. In 2008, and soon after declaration of independence, one of the successors of Mr. Woollett, Afrim Azirin, has been arrested by the local (not international) police because of corruption. It looked like it was not possible to arrest this person earlier because he was backed-up by members of UNMIK⁶.

The rise in Organized Crime marks a serious failure by the UN administration. More than ever, Kosovo is at the heart of the European trafficking in drugs and human beings. The *“Balkans ...already distribute most of Europe’s heroin, facilitate illegal migration and are responsible for nearly 30 per cent of women victims of the sex trade worldwide”* (International Crisis Group 2007).

Illicit trade is developing on its borders. 80% of the smuggling of heroin in North European and 40% in West European are organized by Albanian groups, and four to five tons of heroin cross the borders of Kosovo every month (May 2008). The UN police works closely with the Kosovo Police, but some members of the service are known for their good contacts with local and international criminals, and the same is true for the always necessary language assistants, some of whom have made tremendous careers over the last years, because the internationals needed them and good and reliable interpreters are rare for a language which was used rarely on international level before⁷. A monthly list, issued by UNMIK, lists some 140 brothels, officially “off-limits” to UN employees, for a country of some 2 million people.

Nine years of a UN international protectorate have achieved remarkably little. No progress has been made towards building a multi-ethnic society. The legal system is still not working properly. Some say, it has broken down completely. The province is in a disastrous social and economic situation. There is no indication of why Kosovo should be really equipped for full self-government (Dérens 2007). When the people of Kosovo and their legitimate elected representatives decide one thing, and the international community decides another, the latter will always have the last word, even after the declaration of independence. After nearly ten years of international

⁶ On March 25, 2008, “the Sector of Investigations of Economic Crimes and Corruption of the Kosovo Police Service arrested Afrim Azirin, director of Prishtina Airport, Vlora Ferizi, Procurement officer and Shkëlzen Jusaj, owner of the company Petrol Company. The first suspect is arrested because of the grounded suspicion that he has committed criminal offence of misuse of official duty or authorisations from article 339, exercise of influence from article 345 and fraud in duty from article 341 KPCC. The second suspect is arrested because of the grounded suspicion that he has committed criminal offence: making harmful contracts from article 237, fraud in duty from article 341 and for criminal offence of misuse of official duty or authorisation from article 339 of the KPCC. While the third suspect who is owner of the company Petrol Company is arrested on suspicion of committing criminal offence of fraud of clients from article 242 and assistance in commission of criminal offence from article 25 KPCC. The investigations regarding this case from the Sector of Investigations of Economic Crimes and Corruption of the Kosovo Police Service has started before seven months and the suspects are arrested on the order from the prosecutor, while the criminal allegation against three suspects will be sent to the District Prosecutor’s Office in Prishtina”. Source: Media release of Kosovo Police, http://www.mpb-ks.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=469&Itemid=1.

⁷ This is called the “Mourinho Phenomenon”: Football manager Mourinho earned the nickname *Tradutor* (translator), when he worked with Sir Bobby Robson as his translator and trainer (technically his interpreter) at both Sporting and then FC Porto. Now he is manager at Internazionale Mailand and his transfer from Chelsea was the most expensive one of a manager in soccer history.

administration, many Kosovars are fed up with the arrogant behaviour of the “*white 4x4 gang*”, as locals call the internationals from their habit of driving around the region in white Toyota Landcruisers.

“Mr. Bhattacharya from Bangladesh... is expert in nothing. He is a parking guard, without a drivers license and speaks only Bengali, but he must have paid handsomely in Dhaka, because now he is a UN policeman. There are hundreds of them, incompetent people, within the UN police, within finance and even within the justice system” (Zaremba 2007). They are called “domestic internationals”, “project addicts” or when working for one of the estimated 4,000 NGO’s in Kosovo, “MAN-GOs” (short for MAFia-NGO).

The EU has decided in summer 2008 to spend another 1,3 billion over the next years for the new EULEX mission. *“The internationals feed themselves with their money”, they “eat their own money”,* are common sayings in Prishtina, where at least 15,000 internationals were working (Hofbauer 2007).

10. Organization of administration

UNMIK organizes administration in Kosovo in four Pillars⁸: Pillar I stands for “Police and Justice”, Pillar II for “Civil Administration”, both under the direct leadership of the United Nations. Pillar III is “Democratization and Institution Building”, led by the OSCE, and Pillar IV is “Reconstruction and Economic Development”, led by the EU. It is obvious that only a good and sound cooperation between those pillars and the actors in them guarantees sustainable results. But as experience has shown, this was not always the case.

A main problem occurs in nearly all peacebuilding missions around the world and it also occurred in Kosovo: The necessary number of police was available months or even years later than planned. For Kosovo, there have been 4.700 UNMIK police officers scheduled. In March 2000 (months after the war had ended), only 2.400 police officers have been there, in September 4.000. These officers came from 53 different countries (see picture 4 with data from 2001) and have been allocated to 42 police stations (Stodiek 2003), resulting in some 50 separate national police units practising their own brand of law and order while at the same time preaching the gospel of universal standards (Hansen 2002).

The Kosovo mission was also famous for missing proper equipment: from office material to means for communication, from weapons to police vehicles. In contrast to military, at the beginning of their mission police had to find their own apartments for living, their own office space, and their own office furniture. They got some money from their supervisors and were asked to go and get the necessary equipment for their offices (which is not so easy in a post-war-country).

“There were many factors (for the delay, TF): Insufficient logistical planning, concern for force protection, and a failure to anticipate the full extent of the violence that followed immediately after the war. But the most compelling explanation is that NATO misunderstood the environment and the nature of the threats it harboured” (King/Mason 2006). But this NATO’s slow and messy development was much better

⁸ www.unmikonline.org, Wilson 2006.



than its civil counterparts: “Three months after the conflict UNMIK still did not have a presence in all of the then 29 municipalities in Kosovo. A year after the conflict, there were still fewer than 300 international UN staff to manage a province of two million people... In Kosovo, the international community went from being all-powerful to being ignored, impotent and under attack. Three misconceived explanations have been offered to account for this fall from grace. One is that we shouldn’t have intervened in the first place. The second is that all the shortcomings of the protectorate can be chalked up to the incompetence or cupidity of international officials. The third is that the problems do not exist. None of these views withstand serious scrutiny” (King/Mason 2006).

The Ahtisaari plan called for the Kosovo government to implement policies that address decentralization, economic issues, security and rule of law, protection of religious and cultural heritage, and protections of the rights of minority communities. These challenges had and will have to be met by a very limited cadre of qualified government officials and civil servants. Nine years after the end of the conflict, local and international institutions continue to face difficulties in developing a professional civil service and functioning governing institutions. The challenge for Kosovo is to avoid the creation of a state run by informal governing structures. Too often in the Balkans state power rests in the hands of party bosses whose palms are greased by a network of businesses.

This leads to weak formal governing structures where government positions are seen as an opportunity to earn money and to support family members with jobs rather than a responsibility for the country and the people. King and Mason quote from an interview with Blanca Antonini, Deputy Director of the UN Department of Political Affairs and 1999-2001 Deputy Head of Department local administration UNMIK and Chief of Staff: “The international community –and UNMIK in particular– did not have as a priority the question of culture, and made little to no effort to integrate the experience that both major communities in Kosovo had accumulated prior to the international intervention. By failing to do this, it sidelines as irrelevant an issue of enormous sensitivity in the context of a conflict in which the symbols of cultural identity were often more powerful than weapons” (King/Mason 2006).

11. Social situation in Kosovo

More than half of the Kosovar population is considered as poor. They have to live with less than two euro per day, and 25% have less than one euro per day. 25% have no access to drinking water (UNDP 2006). Between one half and two-third of the inhabitants of Kosovo aged under 25, and more than half of the active population and 70% of those under 25 years are unemployed. Frustration and nationalist dreams produce an explosive cocktail, which has to be dealt with over the next years by the international community (Dehnert 2004). As the local economy is too weak to support sustainable development and is still depending on international aid and the remissions of exiles, the only solution would be to open the western countries for young migrants from Kosovo.

Failed states tend to have failed economies, but failed economies can be the product of either national or international bureaucratic incompetence or of bombs and

embargoes. It also can be the result of the implementation of the recipes defined outside the country. Whatever the reason might be, huge, ineffective reconstruction programs, and a body of neo-colonial administrators became the focus of local resentment in Kosovo. A proper strategy for Kosovo's economic development is still cruelly lacking, which would demand its integration with surrounding countries and offer credible prospects for subsequent European integration.

After nearly ten years of UN administration, Kosovo has an economy stuck in misery, a bursting population of young people with criminality as the sole or main career choice, an insupportable high birth-rate, a society imbued with corruption and a state dominated by organized crime figures (Hofbauer 2007).

12. Police training and education

The Police education in Kosovo was organized from the very beginning by UNMIK and OSCE. The Kosovo Police Academy was founded as early as 1999 to train local police officers and is now the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety Education and Development (KCPSED). The responsibilities were extended since some years to cover other public safety institutions, such as customs, corrections and emergency services. The OSCE ran the school until the end of 2006. In 2007, the management was transferred to Kosovo's provisional authorities. *"As a result of joint efforts, the Kosovo Police Service has become a modern, multi-ethnic and democratic institution that enjoys the public's trust"* to quote General Major Selimi from Kosovo Police Service (KPS)⁹. Ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks and Turks served side by side until 2008¹⁰, with female officers making up fifteen per cent of the force. In 2008, Kosovo Police has 7,300 officers, all of whom have completed the Basic Police Training. One seventh of them went on to attend advanced training courses and hold positions ranging from sergeant to colonel.

The basic training was six weeks at the beginning, and 20 weeks or 800 hours in 2007, followed by a field training of 96 weeks. Responsible for the training have been "international experts", usually *"well experienced and trained police officers from abroad"*, to quote from an OSCE report. They came in usually for some days or weeks. There was nothing constant in terms of personnel besides the director (Steve Bennett) who stayed until 2006, some international co-workers, and some local administrative staff¹¹. A curriculum was developed and evaluations of trainings and seminars conducted, but the basic structure of the Center is still missing some necessary elements concerning the internal structure, the development of a curriculum from job profiles, and the cooperation between the Field Training Officers and the Center's teaching staff. In 2008, the OSCE has prepared an extensive self report of what the Center has achieved over the last years. The independent German Accreditation Agency AQAS was asked to overview, evaluate and certify the training pro-

⁹ OSCE press release http://www.osce.org/spmu/item_2_24849.html.

¹⁰ After the declaration of independence, the Serbian minority established their own Serbia administration and decided to draw themselves back from joint patrols and the UN seemed to accept a pure Serbian police force at least in the northern (Serbian) part of Mitrovica. In other parts of the country, Serbian Police officers are serving under Kosovo-Albanian superiors but in Serbian areas only.

¹¹ Some of the staff left during the transition process, because the salary paid by OSCE before was nearly five times as much as the salary they get from the Kosovo government.

grams. OSCE expect benchmarks for the further work and structure of the institution, elaborated by the experts from England, Germany and Scotland. Until now, the institution itself has no official licence from the Kosovo Ministry of Education, and needs to be accredited as an institution, which has to be done by the national accreditation agency KAA. This agency formally exists since some years, but was not working properly due to political restraints and unprofessional management. In July 2008, the newly elected government decided to restructure this agency, including independent international experts. The private universities in Kosovo are not allowed to take new students unless they are formally accredited by KAA and licensed by the ministry.

13. The role of local police cultures

Independent reports and articles mention another important aspect, why the internationals failed in Kosovo: The missing cooperation between the international organizations and between the internationals themselves. The competition and the resulting lack of coordination among international actors and institutions are serious obstacles to the implementation of “local ownership” and sustainable results. Arrangements for coordination of actions are often not observed, project ideas are stolen from others, with the player with the largest budget or the best connections winning the project. This “beauty contest” among the various organizations and donors and the associated hype of “fashion topics” (community policing being one) usually led to duplication, but hardly to success (Hett 2006).

The reasons for that have been researched on a more general level by Ben-Ari and Elron (2001), showing that soldiers and police officers depend on their own local culture and that they have to, because they will return after their mission to their home countries and professional cultures¹². As a consequence, they stay away from too intensive contacts with locals, and sometimes they are advised to do so. As a consequence, it is difficult for them to understand the local culture, to interpret rightly actions or non-actions of locals or to find out the reason why a person is behaving in a given way. Very often they misinterpret actions or they just do not catch the proper meaning of a communication.

This is not only true for the contact and communication with locals, but also for the communication within the international forces. Ben-Ari and Elron quote a Canadian soldier, seconded to Bosnia: *“If a Greek or Spanish or Chinese person says, ‘You are my friend’, I don’t know what he means. I don’t know if it is his culture, I don’t know if they really like me or that their culture tells them to do so even if they don’t like me. It is still nice, but I am not sure. Same with the Chinese or Indians. If an Australian says that I am his friend, then it is done”*. Ben-Ari and Elron comment as follows: *“Notice that the very terms these people use ‘Greek’, ‘Pole’, or ‘French’ assume that the most important distinctions between soldiers of different contingents are national-cultural ones”*.

In Kosovo and Bosnia, the main military strategy in coping with strangeness in the host countries was to keep physical and emotional distance from locals to the

¹² But some decide to stay as long as possible (six years, e.g. for OSCE) in the mission. Afterwards, they quit the job and retire, e.g., somebody from India, Pakistan or Azerbaijan gets in a UN mission in one month, more than he gets in one year in his home country.

level of alienation and even hatred. Sion (2008) examines the peacekeepers' lack of curiosity about the locals, feelings of helplessness and frustration, and the cultural shock and prejudice amongst internationals. Security always means separation (Rubinstein 2005, Wohlgethan 2008).

The military authorities discourage peacekeepers from having contacts with locals in order to prevent cultural misunderstandings and problems. Sion quotes a Dutch officer: *"We don't need a drunken soldier beating a local over a woman"*, showing that the problem might not be cultural misunderstanding alone. The construction of camps as 'environmental bubbles' discouraged soldiers from venturing outside, even if they are allowed to do so. Sion (2008) is also quoting a platoon commander from Bosnia, referring to locals: *"I don't trust (them). I don't trust their pizza and I don't trust the interpreters. They say what they think you would like to hear. I completely don't trust the people outside the camp. It is the mentality of the people here. They are nice to you and then when you leave they claim that you said certain things or they want their demands met"*.

Very often the necessary qualification of seconded police officers especially from so-called "non-skiing nations" (UN slang for third-world countries like India, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan or African states) is doubted. Higher ranking positions are negotiated between participating states, and at least sometimes the qualification of an applicant is not the first criterion for selection. As the UN –and OSCE– mission in Kosovo is a "non-ranking-mission", the rank of an officer is of less to none importance for filling a position. It could be possible, that a higher ranking officer has to work under a lower ranking colleague, and a lower ranking officer might supervise a higher ranking from another country. Due to the huge differences between the wages at home and for UN personnel, there is also an (illegal) market for such positions in some of the home countries, and very often officers pay a lot of money to be selected as a member of the UN Police force.

Another fact shows the special role of the UN personnel: Kosovo citizens can not sue UN personnel in Kosovo and make them reliable before court. UN personnel have (like diplomats) a special status of impunitiveness and may be object of internal disciplinary actions, but not prosecuted or sentenced by a local court. Often a UN administrative is just sent home if anything has happened that might have resulted in a law case at home. Claims for compensation for damages, caused by UNMIK personnel, have to be brought to court in the respective home country of the UN officer. This can be Bangladesh, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan or Zimbabwe (see picture 4) countries, where rule of law is a chimera. Zaremba (2007) comments the habit of UNMIK: *"Take your human rights and shovel them up your ass! We do as we wish here"*. The consequences are obvious: *"The Kosovans were not particularly law-abiding in 1999, but they did not get any nicer by being treated like Hottentots during seven years"*.

Few positive examples are also mentioned by Zaremba (2007): Swedish KFOR-Troops use blue socks to cover their shoes when entering private apartments of Muslims in Kosovo. They apologize if damages are caused, e.g., during raids, and they take pictures of the damage, which is compensated right on the spot later at the Swedish camp.

14. Peacekeeping as tourism?

Sion (2008) analysed the tension between military combat socialization and peacekeeping missions through ethnographic fieldwork with Dutch peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1999-2000. She showed that their camps function as expatriate communities, playing a similar role to that of the tourist establishments for mass tourism. For her, peacekeepers are like modern mass tourists, who are either unwilling to deal or incapable of interacting with the host environment. This “war tourism” is also called “dark tourism” because of dealing with the consumption of death or distress as a touristic experience of both the distant and recent past (Lennon/Foley 2000). While such “environment bubbles” exist for military missions in different versions¹³, the police works different.

The members of the UN police force in Kosovo (UNMIK CIVPOL) had and have to find their own private apartments, while the military had and still is living in their own camps. They are not allowed to leave the fenced and secured area without permission. At the very beginning of their mission, the members of the UN police had to find and rent space for their “police stations” and they had to buy the necessary equipment by themselves. But military and police officers share at least one passion: souvenir shopping. Teddy bears wearing military or peacekeeping uniforms, special designed patches (some very menacingly) or other souvenirs are sold in and outside the camps. Tax free alcohol and cigarettes are also an attraction, as pirated CDs, DVDs, watches and other stuff, which is sold at small stalls, e.g., just opposite of the UNMIK Headquarters or in department stores close to KFORs “Film City” outside of Prishtina.

Following a model of evolution in local attitudes to tourists (euphoria, apathy, annoyance and antagonism), Sion (2008) shows that the Kosovars were full of euphoria for the internationals, shook soldiers’ hands, invited them to their houses, and wrote “*Thank you, NATO*” graffiti. But coming from a culture of environmental awareness, many soldiers (and police officers) were shocked by how dirty the host countries were: “*Kosovo is a beautiful country, but filthy... the rubbish just grows bigger around its*”. They perceive the locals as lazy people who did not bother about their living conditions, and this is sometimes generalized as a general trait of Muslims. In a press interview, two peacekeepers who served in Srebrenica (Bosnia) dur-

¹³ The quality of the military camps in terms of the amount and quality of leisure facilities, food options and entertainment available is quite different between the participating nations. Whereas most of the national camps are open to other military and police forces, US Camp Bondsteel is accessible for US military only. Foreign soldiers and police need a special permission and are accompanied all the time whilst in the camp. The reason might be: There have been rumours that Camp Bondsteel was used as a secret CIA detentions centre for suspected “terrorists” (some observers saw prisoners in orange-coloured overalls like in Guantanamo) and that “water-boarding” as one of the torture tools of the US military has been used there <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,387762,00.html>, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,386908,00.html>, 16/6/08. The camp, built by the private security company Halliburton, is “the largest US base built in Europe in a generation... Camp Bondsteel guards the strategic oil and transportation lines of the entire region”. It also has the largest prison in Kosovo, “where prisoners are held without charges, judicial overview, or representation” <http://www.ufppc.org/content/view/7209/35>, 16/6/08. Scargill (2007) discusses private policing in context of peacekeeping using the example of “Blackwater”, which has more than 50.000 private military and law enforcement personnel http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Blackwater_USA.

ing its fall said: “*The Muslims looked like animals and sometimes were also treated as such, dirty and smelly*” (Sion 2008).

While the police officers work and operate different from soldiers, they share in part their feelings. Whether this is a result of the very often frustrating experience with the international organization and leadership or brought from home has to be discussed. Not every police officer is prepared properly for such a mission. In Germany, it took some years and some bad experiences to establish professional briefings before the officers are deployed and de-briefings afterwards. My experience with international police officers in Bosnia and in Kosovo over the last years, shows that not everybody has the same understanding of such a mission. As we have experienced after the German unification, the motives and reasons of those who “go East” are different: some do it simply because of money; others are eager to experience something new or want to help to establish new democratic structures in their host countries.

But even some of those, who went to Kosovo with very best intentions, got frustrated in experiencing the laziness and bureaucracy of UN, OSCE and the other international organizations. Some complain about lack of support from their home institutions, resulting in problems coming back and re-integrating themselves in a meanwhile changed professional environment, with changed positions and expectations, usually without having considered the expectations of those who are “far away” from home (Hett 2006, Kühne 2008). Others realize that being part of an international mission opens new professional and personal horizons and possibilities: Usually they are working on a higher rank-level than at home, and the freedom to decide and to structure one’s own work is higher, at least in some positions. After somebody has “networked” some time within the international community he will find ways and means to arrange himself. Some of those get addicted to the strange and always challenging environment and the situation, which is so different from the fixed and settled environment at home. They are eagerly looking forward to their next mission once they are back home, and if their superiors or the ministry do not support their intentions for a new mission or their application for getting a leave without being paid to work directly for OSCE or UN and not being seconded, they sometimes quit their jobs at home and start a new career as international police officers or consultants.

15. Peace and justice

As expressed by Guatemalan Nobel Peace Laureate, Rigoberta Menchú, “*Peace without justice is only a symbolic peace*”. The relationship between peace and justice seems almost axiomatic, although it is in reality quite difficult to organize this relationship. Yet, restoring justice after conflict is as much a political imperative as a social necessity, and the criminological theories on “restorative justice”, developed over the last years (Johnstone 2007, Walgrave 2008), do not consider the special needs of countries in transition. Political leaders will not make concessions, negotiate peace or respect agreements unless their major political grievances have been addressed. The public will not trust the governing authorities and invest in peace unless the injustices they suffered during and prior to conflict are redressed. The necessary starting point in seeking to restore justice after conflict is first to understand the kinds of injustice suffered by ordinary people during conflict. It then becomes

clear that injustice is not just a consequence of conflict, but is also a symptom and cause of conflict.

In the case of Kosovo, it is important to know that after 1989 the regions partly independence within Yugoslavia was slow but constantly taken away by the Yugoslav government. Kosovar Albanians were not allowed any more to be members of the public administration, to work as professors at universities, teachers at schools, or in health care. As a consequence, they built up a “second economy”, with education organized privately in courtyards and medical support provided by doctors in their private houses. A strong system of assistance and mutual support between Albanian Kosovars developed, using the family and clan structures, existing since centuries. They solved their conflicts and problems by themselves and avoided to “bother” the Yugoslav police. It is reported that informal mediation courts in Kosovo solved about 1.000 blood feuds between 1989 and 1999 (Jones 2005; Wilson 2006). To understand this, one must know that an ancient set of rules, the Kanun or Code of Leke Dukagjini, established by the 15th century Albanian feudal ruler, dictated the way people lived in this region for centuries. Renate Winter, an international judge serving on the Mitrovica District Court, said the following: “*The Kanun is really the only law that has been consistently respected here from the beginning until now... The Kanun was basically created to stop the proliferation of unlawful killing... It is extremely clear and detailed when it comes to truces, mediation and the settlement of disputes. These elements should be incorporated into the new laws UNMIK is drafting with regard to civil, commercial and petty crime disputes*” (quote from Beardsley 2007).

The Kanun or formally the “*The Code of Lekë Dukagjini*” (see Ahmeti 2008) is a set of laws¹⁴ used mostly in northern Albania and Kosovo from the 15th century until the 20th century. There are some reports saying that Albanian Kosovars used it again after Yugoslav government took away their partly independence as an autonomous province of Yugoslavia in 1989. These rules have resurfaced since people have no faith in the powerless local government and police. Some communities tried to rediscover the old traditions, but some of their parts have been lost, leading to fears of misinterpretation.

Until now it is still not clear, whether the use of the Kanun during the period between 1989 and 1999 produced more violent conflicts (due to blood feud) or avoided them. Some locals reported to me, that during that time at least some huge gatherings (with 100 and more participants) have been held on the country side of Kosovo to mediate conflicts between feuding families without the police and to restore justice by means of communication and avoiding blood feuds after a conflict had happened.

In 1999, after the intervention of the KFOR, UNMIK took over public administration, police and judiciary. Quite soon they asked the locals to take over the education

¹⁴ This set of laws was a customary one, passed down through the generations, and not codified and written down until the 19th century. Although the Kanun is attributed to Lekë Dukagjini, the rules evolved over time as a way to bring laws and rule to these lands. Some of the most infamous rules specified how murder was supposed to be handled, and it often led to blood feuds that lasted until all the men of the two involved families were killed. The specified gender roles sometimes led to women pledging virginity and living their life as a man, allowing them to take on male responsibilities and rights.



system and the schools. But how can somebody take over responsibility for such an important area like the education of young children not having worked in this field for years and having no experience in public schools? It is also obvious, that the deeply rooted hate against Serbs influenced the content and the style of the everyday education.

For the Justice System, UNMIK tried to establish prosecutor's offices and a court system. But the problems were obvious: There were only some elderly Albanian Kosovar lawyers, trained under the old Yugoslav regime before 1989. The Kosovar lawyers, judges and prosecutors also refused to impose the law, because UNMIK decided that the law before 1999 had to be used, and as this law was imposed by the Serbian majority.

For the Albanian Kosovars this was suppressor's law. It does not matter that UNMIK advised the judiciary that articles, violating basic principles of humanitarian law, may not be applied: They just refused to work with the Yugoslav laws. It took six months to find a compromise. Then UNMIK accepted that the judiciary uses the laws from before 1989, before the time the partial independence of Kosovo was destroyed by Yugoslavia.

Another problem was the cooperation between local and international members of the judiciary: Imagine an English, German, or other international judge or prosecutor applying local law without knowing the language of the law and without being able to read decisions of higher courts. They were totally depending on local lawyers and language assistants and had no chance to control files or decisions taken by local representatives of the judiciary.

It also happened that the international prosecutors and judges, installed by UNMIK and under close political supervision, dismissed or delayed cases against known war criminals, or offenders involved in Organized Crime, to avoid "political difficulties". They released suspects, after they had been arrested and sentenced by local authorities.

One can imagine the consequences for the sense of justice of Kosovar people: Those who ask and demand the locals to establish the "rule of law" and declare the necessity of it for a democratic state, do not obey basic rules by themselves. In 2008, 180.000 law cases are waiting for ultimate settlement, and 40.000 penal law cases are pending (May 2008).

The justice system remains deeply divided between its national and international elements. Human Rights Watch summarized in their most recent report on the judiciary in Kosovo: *"The continuing lack of confidence among international institutions about the ability of the national officials fairly to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate sensitive cases means that national police, prosecutors, and judges are frequently cut out of such cases. The lack of integration in the system undermines its efficiency and hampers efforts to build capacity among national prosecutors and judges. Prosecutors are supposed to be assisted in their new investigative role by a judicial police branch, with dedicated officers. But the branch has yet to be established, largely because of opposition from both international and national police, who fear that a separate branch would create divisions within the police. No formal alternative arrangements have been put in place"* (Human Rights Watch 2008).

16. Security as a public good-even in countries in transition?

The idea that security is a public good has been developed since the end of the 1990's by Clifford Shearing and others (see Ayling/Shearing 2008). Security is a constitutive ingredient of the good society, and the democratic state has a necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good (Loader/Walker 2007). In "weak" or "failed" states, very often the government lacks the capacity to act as a security-enhancing political authority.

In Kosovo, the overall security in terms of offences, registered by the police, and the feeling of security is not as bad as one could expect for a country, where structures of organized crime are widespread. Whether the reason for that was a strong and efficient UN Police may be doubted. In contrast, Kosovo might have been a good example of a society, where informal structures and clan relationships are the basis for a kind of "social efficacy" to be sought and aimed for by criminologists to prevent crime (St Jean/Sampson 2007).

But the situation might change quite soon. With increasing poverty and a widening gap between rich and poor, the social networks fade. Those who do or can not participate in the revival of the economic might look for other ways to get their "just" share. One example might explain the problem: Until recently, those Kosovars, who were working in foreign countries, used to support their families at home on a regular basis. This support is now more and more disappearing. Especially with Kosovo being independent, the former feeling of a suppressed country is fading. Those who work in a foreign country tend to keep their money for themselves to increase their own wealth.

Together with the expected fading away of old bindings and networks and the disappearing role of the "Kanun", more capitalist, egocentric and egoistic feeling will grow up and result in more crimes. This increase in crime was one of the unintended, but unavoidable consequences of the opening and "democratization" of societies in nearly all former socialist countries (starting with the former GDR in 1989).

These countries will follow the "western" ones in a world, where neo-liberalism and the "order of egoism" that it champions (Dunn 2005) has come to be ascendant in ways that have enabled policing and security resources to be captured by those with the greatest supply of economic and social capital and thereby distributed in inverse relation to risk, and hence need (Loader/Walker 2007).

Bearing this in mind, one could expect that the UNMIK did their very best to nurture practices of collective security shaped by inclusive, democratic politics rather than by fugitive market power or by unfettered actors of (un) civil society. But UNMIK not only gave bad examples to the locals by dismissing cases against known criminals due to political reasons, they also did not invent much in building up what might be called a "just society".

If we agree that (as Loader and Walker pointed out) "security is a valuable public good, a constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good", the UNMIK did nothing to establish the necessary structures: Laws and regulations on how and where new buildings may be erected are still missing, as clear regulations in many other spheres.



But not only that the laws are missing; the enforcement of already existing regulations (like on individual traffic and parking) and laws is either missing or depending on coincidence. As the different risks will increase over time in Kosovo as in other countries, it will be important that citizens live together securely with risk and find social and political arrangements to nurture practices of collective security.

It will take years for the “independent” state of Kosovo to have their own laws and not what is called “international law”: regulations by UNMIK, based on Reg. 1244 from 1999 and regulating nearly every field in Kosovo. Even in 2008 and after the declaration of independence, the representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Kosovo, issues such regulations on regular basis. Until June 14, 2008, 34 such regulations or amendments have been issued in 2008¹⁵.

Security needs civilizing, and the state must itself be civilized, made safe by and for democracy (Loader/Walker 2007). On the other hand, security itself is civilizing. Individuals who live, objectively or subjectively, in a state of anxiety do not make good democratic citizens, and fear is the breeding ground, as well as the stock-in-trade of authoritarian, uncivil government (see already Neumann 1957). Loader and Walker (2007, p. 9) argue that security is, in a sociological sense, a “thick” public good, *“one whose production has irreducibly social dimensions, a good that helps to constitute the very idea of ‘publicness’.* Security... is simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities”.

In countries in transition, the public police are not the only or main actor to establish public and individual security, nor can they lay claim to a monopoly over legitimate force inside their territory. Alternative power centres can be found, contesting state authority, “shadow sovereigns” (Nordstrom 2002), operating their own codes of behaviour and mechanisms of enforcement (Gambetta 1993, Varese 2001).

It is obvious that such structures will also develop in Kosovo in due time (they may even already have developed), and that they will rely on the already existing clan-structures and structures of organized crime.

Kosovo has also shown that security is a multinational business, security enterprises trading their wares across the globe (Johnston 2006): Blackwater, DynCorp and other private security enterprises (they are in fact more private military firms or “corporate warriors” (Singer 2003, Scahill 2007) have been involved if not in the war itself (as proven for Iraq), but at least (and proven) in the security activities afterwards.

In 2008, all US police officers, assigned to UNMIK or/and the EULEX-mission are either employed by Blackwater¹⁶, DynCorp¹⁷ or coming from ICITAP¹⁸. ICITAP

¹⁵ <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/Econtents.htm>, 30/7/08.

¹⁶ “Blackwater is currently the biggest of the US State Department’s three private security contractors. At least 90% of its revenue comes from government contracts, two-thirds of which are no-bid contracts... Blackwater prides itself on the fact that no one guarded by Blackwater has ever suffered a fatality or serious injury. However, according to a New York Times report on Blackwater Security in Iraq, ‘among the rank and file of security contractors, Blackwater guards are regularly ridiculed as cowboys who are relentlessly and pointlessly aggressive, carry excessive weaponry and do not appear to have top-of-the-line training’. 122 of its armed personnel in Iraq have been dismissed from their positions by Blackwater since its contract to protect US diplomats began nearly three years ago.



delegations typically consist of only a few law enforcement officers who organize criminal investigation courses, while for the staffing of police positions, the United States government relies on a private contractor (Perito 2003, Deflem/Sutphin 2006). In Bosnia, DynCorp-deployed police were discovered to have been involved in arms trading and the sexual exploitation of women and children (Perito 2004). But not only private police: A monthly list, issued by UNMIK, lists some 140 brothels in Kosovo, officially “off-limits” to UN employees.

Hearings conducted by the US House of Representatives in the fall of 2002 revealed that in Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) members were patronizing Bosnian brothels where trafficked women were kept and having sex with underage girls. There were also reports of International Police Task Force police officers and SFOR soldiers actually “buying” trafficked women and actively participating in the trafficking of women into prostitution by forging documents, recruiting, and selling women to brothel owners.

Derek Chappell, the UN police spokesman in Kosovo reports that interviews with local prostitutes indicated that 70 to 80% of clients were locals. “*While this may be true, the bulk of the profits are from peacekeepers, who have significantly larger amounts of money to spend than locals in a war-torn land*” (Allred 2006; see also Trynor 2004 for Kosovo and Pallen 2003 for Bosnia).

Private Kosovo security companies are establishing their offices for private businesses, and they are protecting not only OSCE, UNMIK or KFOR-buildings, but also critical sites like orthodox churches¹⁹.

Kosovo experienced state suppression over a long period of time and until 1999, and it experienced UN administration as something in between dependence and independence (more dependence at the beginning, more independence at the end). It might happen that it is facing a weak government and weak state now. But as

These firings were most frequently for incidents related to weapons use”. <http://rncnyc2004.blogspot.com/2007/10/blackwater-usa.html>, 30/7/08.

¹⁷ In Iraq, some 1,000 DynCorp-subcontracted US police act as ‘International Police Liaison Officers’ to aid the reorganization of Iraq’s police systems on the basis of a \$750 million contract. US police officials supervised by DynCorp are all US citizens and operate in programs directed by the Department of State. They wear uniforms and carry guns provided by the US government. As such, DynCorp-provided police officials are not to be confused with the security personnel provided by private companies such as Blackwater. There are currently at least 36 such private security companies with some 25,000 employees, mostly from the United States and Great Britain, as well as 16 Iraqi firms registered for security functions in Iraq, besides as many as 50 more companies thought to be operating illegally. Employees from these private security companies, which are to perform various police functions because of the void left by the absence of Iraqi police, have reportedly been involved in several dozen shootings against Iraqi civilians. Private company employees are immune from prosecution under a new law adopted by Iraq’s interim government. The worst form of punishment they can receive is dismissal from their jobs (Deflem/Sutphin 2006).

¹⁸ Although commonly confused as a portion of the International Police, the two are separate entities. Similarities between the two end at the fact that both require experienced police officers with an extensive background in certain fields of expertise. ICITAP is different in that it offers a holistic approach to regional stability and Rule of Law that incorporates the experience, history and influence the Department of Justice enjoys.

¹⁹ In 2008 in Prizren, private security guards are on duty in front of the restored old Serbian-orthodox church and the orthodox theological seminar.

Zygmunt Bauman says: *“Too much of the state is a catastrophe, but so is too little”* (Bauman 2001).

UNMIK has used an internationally recruited policing force as a catalyst in the “nation-(re)building” activities of transitional administrations in Kosovo as in Bosnia and e.g. East Timor (Bellamy et al. 2004, Wilson 2006). But despite superficial appearances and investment of a huge amount of money, manifold problems of establishing a real culture of rule of law are described. Such an intervention like in Kosovo or Bosnia always travel *“with culturally specific baggage, and because of this can never adapt easily to its new environment”* (Loader/Walker 2007) especially with the already mentioned cultural “misunderstandings”, with missing cooperation and communication, bad preparations, and a doubtful own understanding of “rule of law”: multiple sources of authority and accountability have been found in Kosovo, leaving the locals in a situation of uncertainty with confused, conflicting and shifting mandates. A too early promise of an independent Kosovo (mainly by Americans) and a long and finally unsuccessful row of negotiations between US and EU on one side, Serbia and Russia in the other, ended in a situation, where even UN and EU are fighting over the proper way to be present in Kosovo after the declaration of independence.

Logistical problems at the beginning and e.g. during demonstrations in 2007 (resulting in two dead Kosovars, killed by aged and hardened rubber-bullets of Romanian UNMIK Police), a hesitating KFOR during the violent clashes in March 2004, a lack of law enforcement even in 2008, as well as insufficient longer-term institution and capacity building, plus a dim of awareness of, and inability to acquire, the knowledge of local history, culture and conditions are causes of and prerequisite to the ineffectiveness.

“The conduct of security policy in post-conflict situations like that in Kosovo is invariably state-centric, overly technical, and uses pre-conceived templates and ideas about the country. This means that the real needs of communities affected by conflict are unlikely to be met. It also compounds ordinary peoples’ mistrust of the relevant institutions” (ESR 2006). Saferworld, an independent NGO²⁰, is reporting that *“after almost a year of day-to-day work on local safety challenges in a small town in Kosovo (Germova), such as road and environmental safety, the community is now willing to co-operate on hard security issues with local NGOs... the police (KPS) and possibly the international military”* (ESR 2006). Saferworld also reports that perceptions of insecurity inside Kosovo vary from one community to another and thus require targeted responses. Data have shown that minorities (Serbs, Roma) are more likely to feel physically insecure and that for the majority of the Kosovar population, however, community issues such as unemployment, poor electricity supply, inadequate roads and environmental problems are probably of greater concern.

According to Johnston and Shearing (2003), the state in most of the western societies has become but one “node” among several now engaged in the governance of security. Whether as sponsor or provider (Bayley/Shearing 2001), the state collaborates with, competes against, or supports a range of security actors from the priva-

²⁰ Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organization that works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to security. See http://www.saferworld.org.uk/pages/about_us.html, 28/7/08.



te sector or civil society. There is no reason to believe that this is not or will not be the case in Kosovo. As Shearing and Wood (2003) and Bayley (2001) showed: A democratic state has to regulate the provision of security in ways that respond to local needs, reflect local morality and take advantage of local knowledge (Bayley 2001, p. 212). For Kosovo it might be too late for such intentions: On one side, most of the private business of security is already cantoned between the global players in this field. On the other side, the so called “community policing” projects have tried to include locals in security networks, but one may doubt whether this approach was really successful. Even a “*United Nations Community Policing Unit*”²¹ has been established and a Police Chief from Oregon, US was nine weeks in Kosovo “*teaching the country’s police, residents and local leaders to work together*”²². Whether these from US practices adopted “community policing” activities really reflect “local morality” is arguable.

Loader (2006) offers a critique of prominent forms of what he calls “*ambient policing*” (community policing being one) and discusses how policing contributes to or undermines citizen security in democratic societies. One can not finally adjudicate on what really has been done in Kosovo in this respect by internationals without having evaluated at least some of the projects established. But the next years will show how sustainable these activities have been.

In the case of Kosovo, to enable community members to resolve their disputes in ways consistent with justice and human rights while also aiming to address the sources of local insecurities (Wood 2006) one should target not only the “community members”, but also and mainly the Clan members. The family structures, dependencies and commitments which are still existent and dominant in Kosovo, must be considered. In doing so, the “Kanun” should have been included and considered as an important informal regulation. The current Kosovo Penal Code does not contain any provisions from the Kanun, and no acknowledgement of this code is made in the contemporary legal system. The policing activities and the activities of the judiciary in Kosovo, dominated by internationals since 1999, stood away from the idea to include or even to refer to the Kanun, believing this ancient set of rules is both undemocratic and outdated. It is amazing to see how we talk about “restorative justice”, not considering the social situation and the historical background of a society.

If the present system of organizing public security by implementing new policing strategies did not get close enough to the citizens and if the system is not closely cooperating with the citizens, this might result in a “*social fragmentation in so far as it erodes people’s sense of being participants in an ongoing collective project whose members are committed to putting and pursuing security in common, which, in turn, undermines the ‘architecture of sympathy’ (Sennett 2003)*” (Loader/Walker 2007).

It looks like this is already the case in Kosovo.

²¹ <http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/feb05/focusklaw2.htm>. “In a radical and innovative departure from normal policing the officers are to be temporarily housed in facilities not normally associated with policing operations, such as municipal buildings, offices and residential accommodation... Essentially a part of the larger Police System in Kosovo, the Community Police Officers will work closely with all the groups represented within the community, such as ethnic, religious or youth groups, the Municipality and NGO’s. Together with these representative groups, the officers will be involved in the identification and solution of the problems the community faces”.

²² www.policeone.com/training/articles/74160-Ore-Police-Chief-Takes-His-Expertise-to-Kosovo.

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
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
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Picture 1: Bac, u kry! Source: Sticker, sold in Prishtina, summer 2008.




Picture 2: Civil Wars 1945-2002.

Figure 2—The Number of Civil Wars Has Declined Since the Early 1990s as the Number of UN Operations Has Grown



Picture 3: Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping.

Source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf>, 6/8/08.



Picture 4: UNMIC CIVPOL Contingents in 2001.

Source: <http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/factsfigs.htm>, 6/8/08.

Contingents sorted alphabetically			
Country	Total	Country	Total
Argentina	147	Malaysia	47
Austria	45	Malawi	21
Bangladesh	74	Nepal	63
Belgium	1	Niger	0
Bulgaria	98	Nigeria	63
Cameroon	19	Norway	27
Canada	23	Pakistan	186
Cote D'Ivoire	0	Philippines	25
Czech Republic	22	Poland	125
Denmark	27	Portugal	14
Egypt	57	Romania	184
Fiji	35	Russian Federation	119
Finland	25	Senegal	15
France	86	Slovenia	15
Germany	403	Spain	148
Ghana	110	Switzerland	8
Greece	20	Sweden	46
Hungary	5	Tunisia	6
Iceland	2	Turkey	138
India	506	United Kingdom	157
Italy	71	Ukraine	194
Jordan	436	USA	535
Kenya	25	Zambia	38
Kyrgyztan	4	Zimbabwe	61
Lithuania	9		

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